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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Alex Stewart appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to 
the terms of his conditional plea agreement. Specifically, he reserved the right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion. The district court sentenced 
him to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. 
Mr. Stewart subsequently completed the period of retained jurisdiction and the district 
court suspended his sentence for a period of probation. 
Mr. Stewart contends on appeal that the district court erroneously determined 
that a tip from a confidential informant (hereinafter, Cl) gave the officers reasonable 
suspicion to initiate a Terry1 stop on his vehicle. Because the information provided to 
officers by the Cl was not specific, consisted of mainly the Cl's beliefs, and was based 
on hearsay statements of undisclosed declarants, the information was not reliable and 
did not give the officers reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Stewart and his co-defendant, 
Daniel Widner. 2 Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying 
Mr. Stewart's motion. 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
2 Mr. Stewart understands that Mr. Widner also entered a conditional guilty plea 
preserving the same issue for appeal, and that he has appealed to the Supreme 
Court in accordance with the terms of that plea in Docket Number 39908. It is also 
Mr. Stewart's understanding that Mr. Widner has recently filed his own appellant's brief 
in that case. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer Ryan Malenese pulled over Mr. Stewart's vehicle claiming it had failed to 
signal at two different times. (Tr., Vol.1, p.13, Ls.12-13.)3 When Officer Malenese 
approached the window of the vehicle, he was able to detect the odor of marijuana 
coming from the vehicle. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.32, L.18 - p.33, L.2.) This ultimately 
led to a search of the vehicle and the boxes found within. (See generally R., pp.51-56) 
Inside the boxes, officers found 2.9 pounds of marijuana. (R., p.70.) 
Mr. Stewart initially challenged the stop based on Officer Malenese's articulated 
reason for the stop, asserting that there was no requirement for him to signal at either 
location identified by Officer Malenese.4 (R., pp.36-48.) The district court ultimately 
agreed with Mr. Stewart, finding there was no obligation to signal at either location, and 
thus, no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop in that regard. (Tr., Vol.2, p.115, 
Ls.1-12 (finding no requirement to signal where the road, though bending to the right, 
did not stop, but rather, constituted the continuing road of a 'T' intersection); Tr., Vol.2, 
p.118, L.14 - p.119, L.15) (finding no requirement to signal where the road widened 
from one lane into two); Tr., Vol.3, p.9, Ls.11-21 (reaffirming that ruling after viewing a 
video submitted by the state).) The State, however, argued that the officers gained 
3 The transcripts in this case are provided in several independently bound and 
paginated volumes. To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the 
transcripts of the motion hearing held on September 13, 201-1, as well as the transcript 
form the sentencing hearing held on March 19, 2012. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume 
containing the continued transcript of the motion hearing held on October 11, 2011. 
"Vol.3" will refer to the volume containing the final part of the motion hearing, held on 
October 27, 2011. "Vol.4" will refer to the volume containing the change of plea hearing 
held on December 19, 2011." 
4 Mr. Stewart's motion was captioned as "Motion in Limine." (R., p.36.) As the relief 
requested was "excluding all evidence obtained in this manner" it is referred to 
throughout the brief as a motion to suppress. (See generallyTrs.) 
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reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on information received from a Cl. 
(R., pp.119-31.) 
Officer Chris Jessup was the officer who talked with the Cl. (See Jessup Report, 
dated February 1, 2011, attached to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI).) He testified as to his interactions with the Cl during the hearings on Mr. Stewart's 
motion in limine. (See generally Tr., Vol.3.) According to Officer Jessup, the informant 
began providing officers with information pursuant to an agreement with the State, and 
in exchange, the State agreed not to prosecute him/her for delivery of a controlled 
substance. (Tr., Vol.3, p.18, Ls.7-8.) That agreement was subject to termination if the 
Cl provided officers with bad information. (Tr., Vol.3, p.21, Ls.4-12.) Officer Jessup 
testified that this informant had four prior successful tips to his credit, including two 
controlled drug buys from Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.18, L.16 - p.19, L.18.) There was 
no indication that the Cl had any such interactions with Mr. Stewart. (See generally Tr., 
Vol.3.) Officer Jessup described several calls he had with this Cl in regard to this 
particular case. 
First, the Cl contacted Officer Jessup on January 11, 2011, telling him that 
he/she believed Mr. Widner would be traveling to California on one of the next two 
weekends (January 14 or January 21, 2011) to buy more marijuana. (Tr., Vol.3, p.21, 
L.21 - p.22, L.4.) The officer did not testify as to any basis provided by the Cl to support 
that belief. (Tr., Vol.3, p.21, L.21 - p.22, L.11.) Mr. Widner did not, to the officer's 
knowledge, make such a run on either of those dates. (Tr., Vol.3, p.40, L.24 - p.41, 
L.2.) After not hearing from the Cl for ten days, Officer Jessup initiated contact with the 
Cl. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.10-16.) Again, the Cl told the officer that he/she believed 
Mr. Widner would be making a run for more marijuana based on the fact that the Cl had 
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not had contact with Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.17-24.) The Cl followed up later 
that day, informing the officer that Mr. Widner had not left, but was "going to be 
travelling to California." (Tr., Vol.3, p.23, Ls.7-10.) 
Officer Jessup contacted the Cl again on January 26, 2011, and the Cl said 
he/she believed Mr. Widner was going to be making a run that weekend, again based 
on the fact that the Cl had not had contact with Mr. Widner for several days, the Cl had 
not spoken with Mr. Widner in several days. (Tr., Vol.3, p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.15.) "The 
informant eventually told [Officer Jessup] that he or she had learned that Mr. Widner 
was going to be travelling to California on that weekend." (Tr., Vol.3, p.24, Ls.13-15.) 
Officer Jessup subsequently contacted the Cl on January 29, 2011, and the Cl said that 
he/she believed Mr. Widner had left town, again based on the fact that he/she had not 
had contact with Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.25, Ls.2-4.) Officer Jessup attempted to 
corroborate this information, but observed Mr. Widner's cars parked at his house 
throughout the day. (Tr., Vol.3, p.26, Ls.5-13.) As a result, the officer contacted the Cl 
again, who told Officer Jessup he/she would ask around for more information. (Jessup 
Report, dated February 1, 2011, p.2; see Tr., Vol.3, p.28, L.17 - p.29, L.2.) The Cl 
called the officer back and told him only that Mr. Widner had gone with his roommate, 
Mr. Stewart, and they had taken Mr. Stewart's car. (Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.7-11.) The Cl 
did not provide any information about the car; rather, Officer Jessup relied on his own 
knowledge about Mr. Stewart's car. 5 (Tr., Vol.3, p.54, Ls.5-13.) Officer Jessup did not 
remember seeing the car of which he was thinking at Mr. Stewart's and Mr. Widner's 
5 At the hearing on the suppression motion, Officer Jessup did not testify about any 
basis the Cl had given for this information. (See generally Tr., Vol.3.) However, his 
report indicated that the Cl had received this information from an individual whose name 
had been blacked out of the report. (Jessup Report, dated February 1, 2011.) 
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residence from his previous surveillance. (Tr., Vol.3, p.29, Ls.3-12.) There was no 
information presented about the route the car was going to take. (See generally Tr., 
Vol.3.) 
Nevertheless, based on that information, Officer Jessup arranged a surveillance 
operation with his partner, Sergeant Griggs, to try and stop Mr. Stewart's car as it 
returned to Mountain Home. (Tr., Vol.3, p.54, L.23 - p.55, L.6.) The officers informed 
Sergeant Bradshaw, the shift commander, of their plan. (Tr., Vol.3, p.30, Ls.7-12.) That 
information was subsequently passed onto Officer Malenese when he came on duty. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p. 70, Ls.6-12.) Officer Malenese testified he received specific instructions in 
regard to that information: "I was told ... [i]f we were able to develop our own probable 
cause to stop the vehicle, then [the narcotics officers] would come and assist with the 
stop. If we couldn't develop our own probable cause [we were] to radio over to them 
as we were behind the suspect vehicle, and they would advise us what to do at that 
point" (Tr., Vol.3, p.73, L.21 - p.74, L.4.) As such, when Officer Malenese identified 
Mr. Stewart's car, he tried to justify his traffic stop based on the failure to signal. ( See 
Tr., Vol.3, p.72, Ls.17-25.) 
The district court ultimately determined that the informant had been able to give 
reliable information regarding the date of the trip and which car was being used, which 
was corroborated by the officers. (Tr., Vol.3, p.95, L.24 - p.96, L.7.) As such, the 
district court found reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry stop on the vehicle. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.97, L.16 - p.98, L.18.) Mr. Stewart timely appealed his conviction 
challenging that decision pursuant to his conditional plea agreement. (R., pp.203-05.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Whether the information provided by the Cl was insufficient to give the officers 
reasonable suspicion to justify their warrantless seizure of Mr. Stewart's vehicle. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The Information Provided By The Cl Was Insufficient To Give The Officers Reasonable 
Suspicion To Justify Their Warrantless Seizure Of Mr. Stewart's Vehicle 
A. Introduction 
When a Cl provides an officer with a tip, that tip must be reviewed for its 
reliability. If it is not reliable, it cannot justify the officer's warrantless seizure of the 
suspect. In this case, the Cl's information, when considered in the totality of the 
circumstances, was not reliable, and therefore, cannot justify the officers' warrantless 
seizure of Mr. Stewart's vehicle. As such, this Court should reverse the district court's 
order denying Mr. Stewart's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during that 
illegal seizure. 
8. The Cl's Information In Regard To This Particular Case Was Not Reliable, As It 
Consisted Primarily Of The Cl's Beliefs And Third Party Hearsay, Rather Than 
His/Her Own Observations 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State 
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demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated 
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also State 
v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I, 
§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution). 
Officers are allowed to temporarily detain citizens if they possess a reasonable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 30; State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 820 (2004). Officers cannot garner reasonable 
suspicion from hunches, instinct, speculation, or lucky guesses. See, e.g., United 
States v. Sako/ow, 490 U.S. 1, 16 (1989), Marshall, J., dissenting, ("For law 
enforcement officers to base a search, even in part, on a 'pop' guess ... stretches the 
concept of reasonable suspicion beyond recognition .... "); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 
804, 811 (2009) ("[R]easonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 'incohate 
and unparticularized suspicion."'). Such reasonable suspicion may arise from a reliable 
tip provided to officers. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990); Bishop, 146 Idaho 
at 812. When the person providing the tip is known to the police, they are presumed to 
be reliable. 6 Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812. In Idaho, that presumption of reliability is 
rebuttable. Id. The information provided by the Cl is subject to evaluation for reliability 
in the totality of the circumstances, and if it is shown to not be reliable, it does not 
generate reasonable suspicion to justify the warrantless seizure. See id. 
One factor that impacts the determination of reliability is the source of the Cl's 
information. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812. For example, personal observation of events by 
the Cl is a strong indicator of reliable information. State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 66 
(Ct. App. 2009). However, when the information is based on a third party's hearsay 
6 The informant in this case is a known informant. (Tr., Vol.3, p.17, Ls.19-20.) 
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statements, the information is less reliable because the declarant's veracity also affects 
the reliability of the information. 7 Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813-14; see also United States 
v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that an informant's tip that 
was based on information that his relative told to the informant did not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion because the relative was unidentified and "the police here had no 
way of knowing the state of mind of [the informant's] relative when she gave her 
information, or whether she was a person who could be relied on to relate events 
accurately"). As such, even though the Cl may be presumed reliable, that presumption 
does not automatically make hearsay statements in the tip reliable. See Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 813-14. 
Another factor that impacts this determination is the content of the tip. Bishop, 
146 Idaho at 812. For example, the more specific information in the tip, the more likely 
it is to be reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114, 1119 
(9th Cir. 2003). Additionally, where the risk that the information is fabricated is 
increased, the reliability of that information is decreased. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 
275 (2000). Therefore, it is necessary to examine the information provided by the Cl 
in this case to determine if it was reliable before it can be determined to justify a 
warrantless seizure. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812. 
In this case, the Cl provided a series of tips. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.21, L.25 - p.28, 
L.11.) Most of those tips provided very little in terms of content, stating only that the Cl 
could not get hold of Mr. Widner, and therefore, the Cl believed Mr. Widner was on a 
7 This is not to say that reasonable suspicion can never arise from a known informant's 
tip which is based on third party hearsay, because it can. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 814. 
Rather, the fact that the tip is based on hearsay is one factor that is to be considered in 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the reliability or non-reliability of the 
information, and it can affect whether reasonable suspicion arises therefrom. Id. 
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drug run. 8 (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.4; Tr., Vol.3, p.22, Ls.21-24; Tr. 
Vol.3, p.25, Ls.2-4.) Furthermore, the information initially provided by the Cl was that 
Mr. Widner would be making a run on January 14 or January 21, 2011. (Tr., Vol.3, 
p.40, Ls.2-4.) However, there was no evidence that any such trip actually occurred, 
meaning the Cl's beliefs, and thus, the tips, were incorrect. 9 (See Tr., Vol.3, p.40, 
L.24 - p.41, L.2.) 
Officer Jessup called the Cl again on January 29, and the Cl said he/she 
believed that Mr. Widner had gone on a drug run and would return on January 30, 2011. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.24, L.16 - p.25, L.4.) Again, this tip was predicated on the fact that the Cl 
had been out of contact with Mr. Widner, and it was his/her belief that Mr. Widner was 
making a drug run. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.3, p.47, Ls.17-20; Tr., Vol.3, p.25, Ls.2-4.) 
Officer Jessup decided to attempt to corroborate that information. (Tr., Vol.3, p.26, 
Ls.5-9.) However, his investigation revealed that neither of the vehicles Mr. Widner was 
known to drive left Mr. Widner's home that day, and as such, tended to disprove the Cl's 
information. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.26, Ls.10-13.) The inference form Officer Jessup's 
conversation with the Cl following Officer Jessup's attempted corroboration was that the 
Cl would try to get more information in that regard. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.14 - p.27, 
8 The fact that the Cl could not get in contact with Mr. Widner may have indicated 
nothing more than the battery on Mr. Widner's cell phone had died. It certainly does not 
provide an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Subjective intent is not relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion. Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); State v. Schwartz, 133 Idaho 463,467 (1999). 
9 It is not disputed that this Cl had several tips which were accurate, including two 
involving Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.18, L.19 - p.19, L.18.) However, when considered in 
the totality of the circumstances, this Cl's information is incorrect at least one-third of the 
time (two times out of six known disclosures). Additionally, the prior two incidents 
involving Mr. Widner were controlled purchases, which means the Cl was having direct 
contact with Mr. Widner. (Tr., Vol.3, p.19, Ls.11-18.) Therefore, they are of less value 
in determining the veracity of the information arising from the lack of direct contact with 
Mr. Widner. 
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L.2; Tr., Vol.3, p.50, L.18 - p.51, L.15.) Inherent therein is that the Cl would be speaking 
to third parties, as he/she was not able to get in contact with Mr. Widner, who (if the Cl 
was correct) was gone. 10 (See Tr., Vol.3, p.47, Ls.17-20; Tr., p.25, Ls.2-4.) 
Finally, the information that the Cl subsequently provided regarding Mr. Stewart's 
car had no· specifics about the car, which further indicates that the information was 
unreliable. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.7-11; Tr., Vol.3, p.54, Ls.5-13 (Officer Jessup 
admitting the Cl did not give him specifics about Mr. Stewart's car, but that he had relied 
on his own knowledge of the car). 11 The Cl also did not provide any specific information 
about the car's route or destination, beyond "California." (See generally Tr., Vol.3.) The 
lack of specifics, when considered in combination with the fact that the only information 
was premised on the Cl's beliefs arising from a lack of contact with Mr. Widner, 
indicates that this was nothing more than a lucky guess, which does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion. See Sako/ow, 490 U.S. 16, Marshall, J., dissenting; Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 811; compare Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d at 1119 (finding that a tip which 
provided specific details about the suspect car, as well as specific details about the 
route it would take, gave the officers reasonable suspicion). In fact, Officer Malenese 
10 While the record does not indicate it was before the district court at the time it ruled 
on Mr. Stewart's motion, Officer Jessup's report from February 1, 2011, which detailed 
his contact with the Cl, was appended to the PSI. It indicated that the Cl did, in fact, get 
his/her subsequent information in this regard from a third party. (Jessup Report dated 
February 1, 2011, p.2.) That third party was not identified in the record (in fact, his/her 
name was blacked out of the report), nor was his/her veracity questioned. (See 
generally R., Tr.) Therefore, the information he/she provided, relayed to officers 
through the Cl, is less likely to be reliable. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813-14; see also 
J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (where the court is unable to judge the credibility of the source of 
the information, the statement is more unreliable, particularly if there is a risk of 
fabrication); Monteiro, 447 F.3d at 45-46 (uncorroborated hearsay tips are more likely to 
be unreliable). 
11 As a result of the officer's reliance on his own knowledge, rather than having the Cl 
describe the car, it is not even possible to conclude with certainty that the Cl and the 
officer were talking about the same car. 
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was instructed that, unless he was able to identify independent probable cause, he was 
not to pull over Mr. Stewart's vehicle, even though the officers had received the tip from 
the Cl. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.73, L.21 - p.74, L.4.) Rather, he was supposed to request 
further instruction from Officer Jessup or Sergeant Griggs. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.73, 
L.21 - p.74, LA.) 
Therefore, even though this Cl was known to the police, the information he/she 
provided in this case was not reliable so as to give officers a reasonable suspicion to 
seize Mr. Stewart's car. Therefore, the district court's order denying the suppression 
motion was in error and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2013. 
BRIAN R. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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